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ABSTRACT
Many studies have found a negative relationship between oil abundance and democracy. However, recent studies have tried to upend this correlation
by employing time-series techniques or finding a conditionality on other factors. This study contributes to the literature by employing an Arellano
Bond model that corrects for fixed effects and adopts new variables from recent empirical studies. Comparing Eurasia and Latin America from the
1960s to 2010, we find that the theory of a negative relationship between an abundance of natural resources and democracy remains valid.
Keywords: Natural Resource Curse, Natural Resource Dependence, Democracy, Natural Resource Abundance
JEL Classifications: N50, H6, P28

1. INTRODUCTION
Studies on the natural resource curse attempt to identify whether
an abundance of natural resources is an asset or hindrance to
potential economic growth (Asif et al., 2020; Fosu and Gafa, 2019;
Badeeb et al., 2017). To contribute to the literature, we propose
a new econometric technique to consider this phenomenon indepth. At one point in history, it was nearly universally accepted
that dependence on natural resources could lead to adverse
consequences. This agreement stems from the work of Sachs
and Warner (1995), which indicated that dependence on natural
resources hampers economics growth. Similarly, Ross (2001) and
Mahdavy (1970) indicated that dependence on natural resources
could lead to a lower level of democracy.
Several recent studies have challenged the term natural resource
curse” and the negative association that comes with it. Haber
and Menaldo (2011) claimed that reliance on natural resources
does not affect the level of democracy; they argued that most

studies have econometric issues. In response, we propose a new
econometric technique modeled on the Arellano-Bond estimator.
Our research focused on the regions of Eurasia and Latin America
and concentrated on the association between natural resource rents
and democracy. The results indicate that the negative association
between the two variables is still valid. This result is valuable
for policymakers; it could nudge them to avoid dependence on
natural resources.
Beginning with Ross (2001), scholars have employed crosscountry regression frameworks to examine the hypothesis that
mineral-based wealth perpetuates authoritarianism (Aslaksen,
2010; Goldberg et al., 2008; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004;
Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Ross, 2009; 2012; Smith,
2007; Wantchekon, 2002). Most have found that higher oil
revenues lead to a lower probability of a country adopting a
democratic institution. Boix (2003) argued that no country had
ever transitioned successfully to democracy if oil generated more
than one-third of its export earnings.
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Only a few empirical studies have (a) found the opposite to be the
case, (b) differentiated between degrees of the curse, or (c) found
that the natural resource curse was conditional based on other
factors. Herb (2005) reasoned that resource-reliant countries would
have been substantially poorer if they had not found oil, and their
lower GDPs would have caused them to be even less democratic.
Dunning (2008) found that the effect of natural resources on regime
type was conditional based on other factors. According to Ross
(2009), neither Russia nor Venezuela seemed to display a direct
correlation between resource rents and authoritarianism; instead,
they fell into a middle category separate from the states in the
Persian Gulf. Treisman (2010) calculated that, for countries like
Russia with an established oil industry, even significant increases
in the scale of mineral incomes had only a minor effect on the
political regime. Luong and Weinthal (2010) pointed to the state
ownership of the minerals (not the resource wealth) for limiting
democracy. Haber and Menaldo (2011) critiqued the crosscountry empirical studies for their lack of time-series methods
and comparing resource-reliant countries with resource-poor
countries. They concluded there was no discernible influence of
oil on democracy. This study considers the criticism of Haber
and Menaldo (2011) and proposes a new econometric technique
to test whether natural resource dependence affects the level of
democracy.
The study ascertains whether the recent empirical studies have
reappraised the consensus held by scholars that increased oil
revenue leads to less-democratic institutions. Our primary research
question regards the effect of resource rents on democracy and the
conditions under which this effect tends to increase in importance.
To estimate the effects of the factors and interactions proposed in
the literature, we employed a regression technique in which the
dependent variable was democracy, and the explanatory variables
included economic, political, ethnic, and religious factors. We
adapted and modified Dunning’s (2008) quantifiable model and
employed it on five Latin American states and fifteen Eurasian
states from 1960 to 2010. To control for country-specific factors,
we employed an Arellano-Bond model that corrected for fixed
effects critiqued by Haber and Menaldo (2011) in their use of
time-series techniques. We added Loung and Weinthal’s (2010)
variable of state ownership as an intervening variable between
wealth and the institutional outcome. This study further validated
the theory that natural resource abundance hinders the level of
democracy. There is a strong correlation between rising resource
rents—that is, the percentage of oil revenue to GDP—and a decline
in democracy. Meanwhile, countries with higher GDP (regardless
of oil revenues) tended to have stronger democracies than the
other countries, which is another valuable insight for policymakers
around the world.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Literature Review

Ross (2001) published a pivotal empirical study assessing the
association between natural resource dependence and the level
of democracy in a country. His primary explanatory variable of

oil dependence was derived from the ratio between the value of a
country’s oil exports and its GDP. He used the Polity IV index as
a dependent variable to measure the level of democracy among
countries. The study covered the 1971-1997 period. The data
indicated that a country’s oil dependence negatively correlates
with its level of democracy. He concluded that a wealth of oil
was a good indicator of a potentially authoritarian government.
The study attracted several scholars, which helped in producing
several studies that confirmed the negative correlation between
natural resource dependence and the level of democracy (Adams
et al., 2019; Dunn, 2017, Aslaksen, 2010; Goldberg et al., 2008;
Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008;
Ross, 2009; 2012; Smith, 2007; Wantchekon, 2002; Sandbakken,
2006; van der Ploeg, 2011).
Herb (2005) is one of the early scholars who disagreed with
Ross (2001). Herb also assessed the effect of natural resource
dependence on the level of democracy. His sample was based
on several countries in the Middle East and Africa. He used
Freedom House’s democracy score as a measurement on which his
dependent variable was based. Freedom House is an independent
index that assesses the level of democracy of most countries
around the world. He measured a country’s reliance on natural
resources based on the ratio of its natural resource revenues to
its total revenues. He also used Ross’ (2001) dependent variable
of net oil exports as a percentage of GDP while controlling for
several economic, political, and religious variables. The results
showed that natural resources have negative effects on the level
of democracy. However, Herb clarified that his results do not
necessarily support the natural resources curse theory. Herb
(2005) stated that most of the resource-rich countries are located
in politically and economically deficient regions. He elucidated
that countries with higher dependency on oil and natural resources
would still be less democratic if they had not known their lands
contained those resources. Herb’s (2005) fundamental observation
is that the research methods and techniques studies employed
are insufficient for making definitive conclusions that natural
resources hinder a society’s level of democracy.
Several recent studies have noted that techniques employed in the
natural resource curse literature may yield biased results. Dunning
(2008) attempted to address the possibility of conditional effects.
He argued that, historically, Venezuela had a stronger democracy
because of oil, particularly when oil prices were high, as rents
mitigated the redistributive tensions in a highly unequal society.
Dunning proposed two hypotheses: (a) there is a conditionally
positive effect of natural resources on democracy when the degree
of resource dependence is lower; and (b) there is a conditionally
positive effect of natural resources on democracy when the degree
of inequality in non-resource sectors of the economy is higher.
It is the mitigation of inequality, rather than the desire to control
the distribution of resource rents, that becomes the focus of the
elite. This situation then lessens the elites’ incentives to take
power by force.
Dunning (2008) introduced an interaction of private inequality
with resource wealth into his model, with resource wealth as
the independent variable. His results show that resource wealth

International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 11 • Issue 3 • 2021

495

Algharabali, et al.: The Oil Curse Validated: Evidence from Eurasia and Latin America

negatively correlates with the level of democracy. The coefficient
of the interaction term (resource rents and private inequality) was
positive. This result indicates that the effect of resource wealth could
be positive for some countries and negative for others. Dunning’s
finding challenges the theory that natural resources are a curse.
Haber and Menaldo (2011, p. 4) have, however, indicated that, by
adding the capital share of non-oil value, these regressions employ
a measure of inequality that omits the oil sector. This situation leads
to a potential overestimation of the share of income earned by labor
in oil-rich countries with undiversified economies, such those as in
the Middle East. That is, the regressions in the literature may not
account for a fixed effect associated with undiversified oil economies.
Treisman (2010) argued that fears of rising authoritarianism
associated with rising energy prices had been exaggerated. He
calculated that even large increases in the scale of mineral incomes
had only minor effects on the political regime of countries with an
established oil industry. He employed Polity IV scores (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2010) and regression with fixed and random effects,
thereby controlling for country, year, GDP (logged), and oil and
gas income per capita (logged). Apart from the polity scores, the
data in Treisman (2010) are from the Penn World Tables.
Treisman claimed his findings indicated that the volatility of
Russia’s petroleum income could explain no more than a small
fraction of the changes in its political regime between the 1985
and 2010 period. However, a polity is not capable of generating
a high, explainable variance (r-squared). Moreover, the data
from the Penn World Tables are at 5-year intervals. Thus, while
Treisman’s sample size is larger than other studies, his model does
not facilitate controlling for measured, explanatory factors capable
of estimating the mediating effect of interaction between oil rents
and other variables, such as state ownership.
Loung and Weinthal (2010) criticized the resource curse literature
for failing to specify the causal mechanisms that link resource
wealth to negative economic and political outcomes. They argue
that ownership and control of the mineral sector is the crucial
intervening variable between wealth and the institutional outcome.
Their work focused on five petroleum-rich states that were former
members of the Soviet Union—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Their data (from 1990 to 2005)
indicated that ownership structure is not endogenous to fiscal
regimes and is not a universal principle; however, it is a variable
in the analysis of developmental prospects for mineral-rich states.
Their work highlights the importance of including a variable
controlling for the ownership of the country’s mineral industry.
Dunning (2008) and Treisman (2010) employed regressions, of
which Haber and Menaldo (2011) criticized because countries
differ from each other based on fixed, unobserved characteristics.
Haber and Menaldo (2011) studied records from 168 countries for
the 1800 to 2006 period, constructing four unique measures of
natural resource reliance and two popular measures of regime type.
They wanted to detect and estimate time-series relationships to
determine whether a wealth of natural resources always gives rise
to autocracy or whether this only occurs under certain conditions.
496

They categorized countries according to income level, inequality,
the threshold level of resource reliance, period, and region and
estimated separate regressions on these subsamples. Hypothesizing
a counterfactual path that a resource-reliant country’s regime
type would have followed in the absence of those resources,
they compared this path to the actual path to see whether any
divergence of the paths correlated with increased resource reliance.
The only statistically significant relationship they found was that
increased natural resource incomes are positively correlated with
an increased level of democracy.
By using the polity score that correlates over time in a dynamic
relationship, Haber and Menaldo (2011) argued that the fixed
characteristics could a) lead to higher or lower polity scores,
b) include oil and natural resources, and c) create apparent
correlations which are devoid of causal interpretation. The dynamic
relationship results in 1 year’s polity score will imperfectly predict
the next year’s, as factors change over time.
Haber and Menaldo (2011) primarily used an error correction
model. As the name implies, this model is used to describe a time
series in which the equilibrium, or investment level, is sought over
several periods and found by correcting errors. Their equilibrium
polity is attained over several periods and is possibly affected by
fiscal reliance (percentage of government revenues from oil, gas, or
minerals) on oil income, civil war, regional democratic diffusion,
world democratic diffusion, or country fixed effects. Explanatory
variables are entered as levels, changes, and lagged changes.
However, grouping countries in this manner misses the effects
of own-country lags and fixed effects. The apparent resource
curse is, thus, a downward adjustment of polity scores over time
toward equilibrium—the lagged polity score term—which has a
statistically significant and negative effect in every model. Thus,
resources are reducing that downward trend.

2.2. Hypothesis Development

Given the literature, there are two streams of findings: one finds
that natural resources can affect the level of democracy negatively,
and the other finds that there is no association between natural
resource dependence and the level of democracy. This study
bridges between the two streams by using a new econometric
technique that accounts for much of the criticism that different
authors have raised. With this new econometric technique, we
aimed to determine whether natural resource dependence affects a
country’s level of democracy? Based on the results of most papers
in the literature, we hypothesized that natural resource dependence
would indeed affect the democracy level, and the effects would
negatively correlate with the level of natural resource dependence.
More succinctly, we hypothesized that the dependence on natural
resources leads to a lower level of democracy (H1).
H1: Dependence on natural resources leads to a lower level of
democracy.

3. MATERIALS AND METHODS
We follow the extant literature in four ways. We consider Dunning’s
(2008) study on the resource curse in Latin America and compare
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it to Eurasian countries. This consideration allows us to observe
whether there is something particular to Latin America, specifically
whether Venezuela is an outlier to the consensus that more oil
means low-level democracy. We also expand the period from 1960
to 2010, enabling us to estimate the longer-term effect of natural
resources on a country’s regime type. We start with an enhanced
version of Dunning’s model with econometrics, controlling for
country fixed effects. Finally, we introduce a new variable of
state ownership, previously applied only to Eurasian countries,
which tests whether the timing and role of the government affect
the tendency for natural resources to hamper democratic systems.
Studies have used either graphical analysis or estimation, separately,
for each of several countries, sets of countries, or periods to control
for country fixed effects. Tests of co-integration between fiscal
reliance and polity (i.e., whether there is a long-term, equilibrium
relationship) have generally failed to find evidence for such a
relationship. This situation implies, in macroeconomics, that a
regression in levels might be subject to a correlation of trends, such
as spurious correlation, thus signifying no real relationship at all.
We added fixed effects to the Dunning (2008) model to control for
fixed characteristics of countries and changes in the explanatory
variables such as natural resource rents. Fixed effects cannot
control for changing but unobserved characteristics of countries,
and neither can any other technique. We minimize that problem
by controlling for various factors that do change. We also estimate
random effects, mostly as a robustness check, because we do not
believe that fixed effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables, which is an assumption that random effects impose.
Fixed effects are differenced out of the model, changing all
variables to differences over time. The differencing automatically
controls for the lack of equilibrium in levels, which presents
another challenge. It is important to note that the fixed effects
might be inadequate (Haber and Menaldo, 2011), and the strongest
correction would be to include a lagged dependent variable
controlling for many unobserved aspects of the country. This
situation immediately creates a larger problem: the fixed effect
correlates with the lagged dependent variable and its differences.
The solution to this basic problem in the estimation of time series
over panels of countries, people, or businesses is the ArellanoBond estimation (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond,
1991; 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The estimation offers an
alternative to standard fixed effects that could help improve the
Dunning (2008) model and accounts for Haber and Menaldo’s
(2011) critique of the standard fixed effects.
In the Arellano-Bond estimation, the lags and levels are not
exogenous to the Polity determination. Thus, either the specification
is faulty, or some explanatory variable is endogenous. We changed
the state ownership to endogenous (i.e., jointly determined with
polity), which solved the problem. While we did not anticipate
this, it is the only change we made to the specification.

3.1. Measuring Regime Types

The dependent variable in our study is the democracy score,
measured from the Polity IV data set, which is referred to as polity

(Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). This standard measure of democracy
employed in the resource curse literature is an index of a) the
competitiveness of political participation, b) the openness and
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and c) the constraints
on the chief executive; coded for all countries worldwide, from
1800 to date. The scale runs from −10 to +10. Scores of −10 to −6
represent autocracies, and scores of 6 to 10 represent democracies.
We decided to use the polity index to measure democracy because
it is the standard way employed by most studies.

3.2. Control Variables and Instrumental Variables

We replicated Dunning’s Latin model, compared with Eurasian
countries, and employed a different econometric method. Our
sample consisted of 15 Eurasian states (former Soviet republics),
compared to 5 Latin American states. We have addressed Luong
and Weinthal’s (2010) criticism of the resource curse literature
as being too narrow in scope and duration (primarily covering
1970 to 1990) by expanding our timeframe beyond Dunning’s
work to cover the 1960-2010 period. We have also addressed the
second criticism of Luong and Weinthal (2010) by including a
variable controlling for oil ownership. Haber and Menaldo’s (2011)
criticism of the use of standard fixed effects was also considered.
The Soviet Union collapsed into individual states in 1991; thus,
the number of countries increased after this year. Before then,
where available, the individual Soviet Socialist Republics were
considered. We have corrected for this situation with fixed effects,
which identify the individual countries. To estimate the mediating
effect of interaction with oil rents and the effect of state ownership,
we used a smaller set of countries than Treisman (2010) and
incorporated a larger set of explanatory variables. Moreover, rather
than the 5-year intervals in the Penn World Tables, the data are
annual. Although our approach utilized a smaller sample size than
Treisman (2010), this provided the ability to control for measured,
explanatory factors. To compare Dunning’s (2008, p. 130) findings
in Latin America with Eurasia, we replicated all of his variables,
except capital share. Our estimation equation was as follows:
Dit = α + β1 Rit + β2 θit + β3 (Rit * θit) + Xit ¥ + λi + εit(1)
Dit refers to a country’s democracy level in country i and year t. Rit
is the resource rents per capita in a country. θ is the total natural
resource rents over GDP. β3 represents the coefficient of the
interaction term between the resource rents per capita and the total
natural resource rents over GDP. X is a vector of control variables.
λ represents the fixed effects, and ε is a random error.
We did not include Dunning’s capital variable, given that the
data were only available for Latin America. We created our own
variable, Oil Rents Per Capita, in $1 million units. We divided
the oil rents as a percentage of GDP by population from 1970
to 2010. We replaced Dunning’s Capital Share and Oil Rents
* Capital Share (Interaction term) variable with Total Natural
Resource Rents as a Percentage of GDP and Oil Rents * Total
Natural Resource Rents as a Percentage of GDP (interaction term).
Data came from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
database online. The total natural resource rents represent GDP
dependence on natural resource wealth within the country.
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Dunning argued that the capital share variable provides a useful
indicator of private inequality. Although a relatively poor majority
obtains most of its income from labor in many countries, capital
income tends to accrue to a relatively small elite (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006a, p. 58-9, in Dunning, 2008, p. 117).
As noted above, Haber and Menaldo (2011, p. 4) have critiqued
Dunning (2008) for employing the capital share of non-oil valueadded as a measure of inequality that omits the oil sector. Like
Dunning (2008), we employed log GDP. However, unlike Dunning
(2008), we employed a quadratic term for GDP. Lower levels
of GDP do not show a significant effect. A larger GDP helped
our analysis. Even though it is significant, it is still not linearly
related. In all regressions, we controlled for the natural log of the
countries’ GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity from the
Penn World Tables) to control for the assumption that developed
countries tend to be more democratic. All regressions were run
on panels that included all countries for which data was available
for the period from 1960 to 2010.
Alesina et al. (2003) served as the data source for the Ethnolinguistic
Fractionalization, Muslim Percentage 2001, Catholic Percentage
2001, and Orthodox Percentage 2001 variables. We assumed
2001 figures and equivalencies from 1960 through to 2010. We
excluded the British Colony variable, as it does not pertain to
Eurasia, nor was it a significant variable in Dunning’s (2008)
modeling of Latin America. We also did not include the Sum
of Transitions to Authoritarianism (adopted by Dunning from
Cheibub and Gandhi, 2004; see Przeworski et al., 2000), which
some researchers use because they believe democracy is best
measured as a binary variable. Haber and Menaldo (2011)
employed Regime (Przeworski et al., 2000), which extends from
1800 to 2000. However, we adopted the aforementioned polity as
our measure of democracy.
We introduced the State Fragility Index variable available from
the polity and Fragility Index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010) to
control for the effectiveness and the performance of each country.
Following Luong and Weinthal’s (2010) research, we adopted
their variable of ownership structure, extracting the Eurasian and
Latin American countries under review from the cross-sectional
dataset compiled on all relevant countries from 1900 to 2005. They
disaggregated ownership and control into four possible resource
development strategies: state ownership with control (S1), state
ownership without control (S2), private domestic ownership (P1),
and private foreign ownership (P2). Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics of the variables of our study.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable

Mean

Min.

Max

2.318
0.025

Standard
deviation
6.615
0.044

Polity
Oil Rents per capita in
$1,000,000 units
Total natural resource over
GDP
Oil rent per capita * Total
natural resource over
GDP (interaction terms)
Log GDP
Square of Log GDP
Ethnolinguistic
Fractionalization 2001
Fragility 2010
Muslim percentage 2001
Catholic percentage 2001
Orthodox percentage 2001
State ownership of oil

−9
0

10
0.3

14.782

28.283

0

214.5

0.784

2.282

0

20.8

24.074
583.042
0.288

1.872
90.604
0.216

7.144
19.100
38.228
12.652
1.633

4.418
33.549
40.790
22.126
1.520

20.6
28.1
423.3 791.8
0.0193 0.6621
0
0
0
0
0

14
93.41
92.72
89.04
4

State ownership is a scale 0‑4 with a distribution

There is statistically significant evidence of country effects, and their
correlation with the fitted values, −0.449, is a correlation whose
standard error is the square root of 1/490 (or about 0.045). Random
effects cannot account for the statistical correlation, as it is too far
from zero. Nevertheless, the random-effects model is not much
different from the fixed effects model in its parameters (available
upon request) despite the misspecification that can happen.
Consistent with Dunning (2008), the fixed effects model has a
statistically significant effect on the main two variables of the
model: oil rents per capita and their interaction with total natural
resources. The level of democracy is negatively associated with
oil rents per capita and positively associated with the interaction
term. These results account for only the Latin countries for a proper
comparison to Dunning’s (2008) model. Our results indicated a
negative association between oil rents per capita (see the second
column of Table 2). However, Dunning’s study (2008) indicated
oil rents per capita as positively associated with the level of
democracy. One reason for this discrepancy may be that the results
shown in Table 2 are based on panel-fixed effects regressions, in
contrast with Dunning’s (2008) OLS regression.

4. RESULTS

Results similar to Dunning’s (2008) were expected; this study, in
part, replicated his work. However, our study utilized what we
believe to be a better estimation technique. Our results focus on
fixed effects, though it is likely that polity correlates over time, thus
the need for employing an Arellano-Bond estimation technique. In
other words, the fixed-effects model overestimates the results, but
the Arellano-Bond estimates more statistically significant results
(see column 4, Table 2).

Polity, theoretically ranging from −10 to +10, comprised the
dependent variable for this study. The countries in this study had
a polity score of −9-10, with a mean of 2.3, a modal average of −9
and +8, and a standard deviation of 6.6. Table 1 shows descriptive
statistics for the regression distribution and all other variables,
and Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates and tests of various
hypotheses.

The Arellano-Bond estimates employ many lags of levels and
differences as instrumental variables, and their exogeneity must be
tested. The generalized methods of moments tests allowed us to run
our exogeneity test. With one lag of polity (shocks to polity require
2 years to sort through the system), the test rejects exogeneity (P
< 1%) (results available upon request). As noted above, our study
determined state ownership jointly with polity; that is, it was
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Table 2: The fixed‑effects model
Variable
Polity lag 1
Polity lag 2
Oil Rents per capita in $1,000,000 units
Total natural resource over GDP
Oil rent per capita * Total natural
resource over GDP (interaction terms)
Log GDP
Square of Log GDP
State ownership of oil
Constant term

Fixed Effects model
(Latin Countries Model)
‑
‑
−111.0392** (22.86739)
0.0580197 (0.0664899)
1.675617** (0.579682)

Fixed Effects Model
(Full Sample)
‑
‑
−62.90901** (11.23303)
−0.0029702 (0.0154568)
0.5076285* (0.201352)

Arellano‑Bond Model with 2
Lags and Robust (Full Sample)
0.7947351** (0.0468131)
−0.0859603 (0.04479)
−19.90192** (6.889187)
−0.0043624 (0.0091771)
0.224422* (0.1238923)

−58.95418** (7.785759)
1.240288** (0.1526189)
−1.796906** (0.4677404)
706.3166** (99.38653)

−25.96136** (3.803872)
0.5909871** (0.0775912)
−0.7683562* (0.2990474)
284.9869** (46.58565)

−8.905981** (2.449826)
0.1965821** (0.0505975)
−0.195149 (0.1744664)
101.2006** (29.69831)

*Means P<0.05, and **means P<0.01. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors. The dependent variable is a polity score (democracy level)

endogenous with polity. It also employed two lags of polity, resulting
in a marginal P-value of 5.5% in the second lag. In the interest of
caution in modeling, we kept the second lag. Moreover, it forces
acceptable lags of levels and changes in other variables further into
the past. Thus, the exogeneity is no longer rejected (P = 19.5%).
The Arellano-Bond model, with two lags and a robust standard
error, shows that the estimated effect of one standard deviation
change of oil rents per capita (0.032) on polity is about −20 times
0.032, or −6.4 points. That is an entire standard deviation of polity
and a substantial effect on a scale from −10 to +10. All estimations
find that GDP has a non-linear effect on polity, reducing it to the
level of log GDP, which is equal to the linear term divided by twice
the negative of the quadratic term, 8.906/(0.394), or about 22.6.
The range of log GDP is 20.57 to 28.37, and about one-fourth of
the observations are below 22.6. Thus, the effect of GDP is only
slightly negative for the poorest countries and positive for most
countries. From 20.57 to 22.6, the effect is a drop of less than one
point of polity, but the increase is over six points, approaching
28.37 (The constant term corrects for the mean of log GDP). The
estimates of the effect of GDP are greater with fixed effects only,
but the lack of lagged polity effects overstates those estimates.
The fixed covariates, ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 2001,
fragility in 2010, Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox percentage of
the population in 2001 can be tested only in the random-effects
model (the random effect model is available upon request). They
are collinear and statistically significant as a group (P = 1%), which
might result from the correlation with the fixed effects, which these
variables appear to be part of. In any case, they are controlled for
in the fixed effects and the Arellano-Bond estimation.
Our study found that having a higher GDP is good for a country.
These findings agree with the majority of the literature: high oil
profits tend to result in poor economic performance, unbalanced
growth, weakly institutionalized states, and authoritarian regimes.
More succinctly: oil is indeed a curse. Thus, we disagree with
Dunning’s (2008) claim of an observed variation mediating the
relationships between resource rents and political regime types.
However, we do agree with Dunning’s (2008) second hypothesis
that a high ratio of total natural resource rents to total GDP leads
to dependence. We also agree with Dunning (2008) that the total
amount of natural resource rents is a weaker factor than its ratio
to total GDP. However, Dunning (2008) nor we directly support

the hypothesis that there is a conditionally positive effect of
natural resources on democracy when the degree of dependence is
lower. Instead, we address the same primary question as Dunning
regarding the relationship between the ratio of total natural
resources rents and the total GDP, using a different econometric
approach with countries across Latin America and Eurasia.

5. DISCUSSION
Dunning’s (2008) work compliments the later critiques of the
rentier state literature. He argued that there are conditional factors
that determine the impact of natural resources on a state. First, there
is a conditionally positive effect of natural resources on democracy
when the degree of resource dependence is low. Authoritarianism
is heightened, not necessarily by resource wealth (not all oil states
are authoritarian) but by the extent of the dependence on these
rents. When resources are the only economical source, conflict over
the distribution of rents is more influential than the redistribution
of non-resource wealth.
Second, there is a conditionally positive effect of natural
resources on democracy when the degree of inequality in nonresource sectors of the economy is high. Rents can mitigate
the redistributive tensions in a highly unequal society. It is the
mitigation of inequality rather than the desire to control the
distribution of resource rents that becomes the focus of the elite.
This situation then lessens the elites’ incentives to take power
by force.
We disagree with Dunning (2008) that other variables mediate the
relationship between resource rents and the political regime type;
thus, we, consequently, explain variation in observed outcomes
across resource-rich states. We agree with Treisman (2010) that, for
countries like Russia with an established oil industry, significant
increases in the scale of mineral incomes have only a minor effect
on the political regime. We agree with Ross (2009) that there are
degrees of being cursed and natural resources other than oil affect
democracy to a lesser degree in comparison.
Treisman concluded that “controlling for country characteristics,
and looking at the full period, it is only among very poor countries
that oil and gas income correlates over time with less democracy”
(2010, p. 8-9). We agree; extremely poor countries demonstrate
a greater variance and provide for more pronounced results than
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more affluent countries, which is why our model controls for total
GDP. We also disagree with Loung and Weinthal (2010), who
argue that state ownership (instead of natural resource wealth) is
the main factor affecting democracy levels. Loung and Weinthal
did not provide robust and empirical support for their argument,
but we tested the validity of their argument and could not find
support for it. The variable of state ownership is statistically
significant in the fixed effects model, which deals with it as an
exogenous variable. However, we did not find state ownership to
be statistically significant using the Arellano-Bond model, where
we dealt with it as an endogenous variable.
It is also important to indicate that our results contradict the
findings of some studies in the natural resource curse literature
that have used panel research designs. For instance, Lederman
and Maloney (2008) argued that the negative effects of natural
resources could disappear by including fixed effects. Torres et al.
(2012) have also provided evidence that the negative effects could
disappear in a panel design. However, using neither a fixed-effects
model nor our Arellano-Bond model provided results that correlate
with these arguments.
If one examines the intercountry variation, the strongest correlation
is among countries at intermediate levels of development, with
GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) between $5,000
and $15,000. Ross (2009) noted that the association between higher
resource wealth and less democracy does not appear in data from
before the early 1980s. Until then, oil and gas did not appear to
have any effect on democracy. It was in the “Third Wave” of
democracy, which culminated in the East European transition
from communism, that major oil producers started to stand out,
democratizing less than their oil-poor neighbors. Fixed effects
regressions show no effect of oil on democracy before 1985, and
random effects models indicate that earlier periods demonstrated
weaker effects, compared to more recent periods. Note that random
effect models might be misperceived, as discussed above. Oil rent
per capita consistently has negative effects, and the interaction
term is also statistically significant.

6. CONCLUSION
There has been much debate in the natural resource curse literature
on finding the answer to whether natural resources affect the
level of democracy within a country. Starting with Ross (2001),
numerous studies have suggested a negative correlation between
natural resource dependence and the level of democracy. However,
Haber and Menaldo (2011) published an influential study to rebut
this trend. Haber and Menaldo (2011) claim that most studies
finding a negative association suffer from serious econometric
issues. Their findings strongly reject a resource curse, but the
results still depend on specification.
This study utilized both a fixed-effects model and a lagged Polity
effects model for Latin American and Eurasian countries. It has,
again, found support for the resource curse theory. Our study has
accounted for the criticisms raised by Haber and Menaldo (2011)
by using an Arellano-Bond model. We have also accounted for
Loung and Weinthal’s (2010) criticisms by adding a variable to
500

control for state ownership of the natural resources. Our results
from both the standard, fixed-effect model, and the ArellanoBond model show that a) oil wealth negatively affects the level
of democracy, and b) there is a negative correlation between oil
rents per capita and Polity.
This study supports the theory that the more oil revenues a state
accrues, the less likely it is to experience a democratic system.
The generalized method of moments estimation employs lags and
levels as instrumental variables, allowing for both fixed-effects
and lagged dependent variables. Thus, our findings allow us to
state that natural resource dependence is really a curse.
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